The normative significance of identifiability by Żuradzki, Tomasz
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Ethics and Information Technology (2019) 21:295–305 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9487-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
The normative significance of identifiability
Tomasz Żuradzki1 
Published online: 31 October 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
According to psychological research, people are more eager to help identified individuals than unidentified ones. This phe-
nomenon significantly influences many important decisions, both individual and public, regarding, for example, vaccinations 
or the distribution of healthcare resources. This paper aims at presenting definitions of various levels of identifiability as well 
as a critical analysis of the main philosophical arguments regarding the normative significance of the identifiability effect, 
which refer to: (1) ex ante contractualism; (2) fair distribution of chances and risks; (3) anti-aggregationist principles that 
recommend the distribution of bad effects and the concentration of good ones. I will show that these arguments, although con-
nected with interesting philosophical problems regarding e.g. counterfactuals, aggregation, or probability, are unconvincing.
Keywords Identifiability effect · Identified victim effect · Statistical lives · Uncertainty · Risk · Healthcare · Rule of rescue
Introduction1
The concepts ‘identified individual’s life’ and ‘statistical 
life’ were introduced in 1968 by the American economist 
(and later Nobel laureate) Schelling (1968). In his article 
‘The Life You Save May Be Your Own’ (which adopted the 
title of a previously published short story by the American 
writer Flannery O’Connor), Schelling noted that people are 
more eager to contribute to saving an ‘identified individual’s 
life’ than to saving a ‘statistical life’. He understood an ‘iden-
tified individual’s life’ as the life of a known person who 
needs help at a given moment, a ‘statistical life’ as the life of 
a person whose identity is not known to the decision-maker 
at the moment of deciding (I will discuss more detailed defi-
nitions in “Defining levels of identifiability” section). Schell-
ing pointed out that such a preference may have a significant 
impact on the way public or private resources are spent. 
Here is a frequently quoted example from Schelling’s text 
regarding healthcare:
Let a 6-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of 
dollars for an operation that will prolong her life until 
Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with 
nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that 
without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachu-
setts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible 
increase in preventable deaths—not many will drop a 
tear or reach for their checkbooks. (115)
This story is one of many examples—either real or hypo-
thetical—which are still used in empirical and theoretical 
studies on the problem of identifiable individuals. This 
anecdotal evidence has been partly confirmed by empirical 
studies (for reviews, see: Kogut and Ritov 2015; Small 2015; 
Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. 2017). This is one way in which, 
for example, one can interpret studies whose participants 
were more eager to compensate a loss to others, or would 
give more money to a charity, if the potential beneficiaries 
had already been chosen at the moment of decision-making 
than in a situation in which the beneficiaries were supposed 
to be chosen after the participants made the decision. The 
preference was visible in a situation where the participants 
themselves did not know—and were aware of the fact that 
they would never know—any other meaningful personalis-
ing information concerning the individuals whose loss they 
were compensating or whom they were helping (Small and 
Loewenstein 2003). However, studies on this topic do not 
prove clearly which psychological mechanisms this prefer-
ence is based on: the fact that a given person was identi-
fied ex ante (by a number, name, etc.), even if the decision-
maker knew none of the person’s particular features, or other 
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characteristics of the situation, e.g. singularity (Kogut and 
Ritov 2005).
Another assumption is that more people prefer to harm 
innocent unidentified people at the moment of decision-
making than to harm identified individuals. Although the 
effect in this case is not as well-documented in behavioural 
research, it is apparently one way in which one can interpret 
studies that show, for example, the reduced level of accept-
ance of a policy requiring trade-offs between different peo-
ple (e.g. affirmative action) when the cost of such a policy is 
borne by identified people (Ritov and Zamir 2014).2
Therefore, I assume that the identifiability effect has two 
main forms: (1) greater readiness to help identified people 
than unidentified ones; (2) greater readiness to take actions 
harmful to (innocent) unidentified people than to take 
actions harmful to (innocent) identified ones.
In this article I analyse the normative status of decision-
makers’ preferences of this type and consider whether they 
are morally justifiable or, rather, constitute certain kinds of 
preferential anomalies. Answering this question about the 
normative significance of the identifiability effect is impor-
tant in the context of moral enhancement or moral technolo-
gies that ’attempts to bridge the gap between moral psychol-
ogy and normative theory by recommending ways in which 
we, as moral psychology describes us, can become more 
as we should be, as normative theory prescribes’ (Alfano 
2013). Obviously, before we start using any moral technol-
ogy we must decide in what direction are we going to steer 
our own or others’ behaviour; the aim of this paper is to 
describe situations in which this task is particularly diffi-
cult, because it depends on the content of normative doc-
trines or accepted values. I also show how difficult it is to 
use knowledge of the psychological foundations of human 
moral behaviour to ‘debias’ behaviour or ‘steer it toward a 
more rational path’—for example, in healthcare, since this 
process depends on what constitutes ‘a rational path’ as well 
as on the distinction between biased processes and perfectly 
rational reactions. Thus, before we can ask whether it is even 
possible or feasible to debias human behaviour in the case of 
the identifiability effect, we should establish its normative 
significance.
The identifiability effect is visible in many individual and 
public decisions. In the long run it may lead to inefficient use 
of scarce resources: decision-makers with these preferences 
have a lesser chance of achieving the goals they consider the 
most valuable, e.g. maximising the number of people saved. 
This may be visible in many healthcare decisions: the rule 
of rescue recommends rescuing identified people whose life 
is in imminent danger, (Hope 2001; McKie and Richard-
son 2003). The significance of the identifiability effect was 
analysed recently for example in discussions over dividing 
limited resources between the prevention and treatment of 
AIDS in Africa. Some authors argued that it is more effec-
tive to spend a limited budget on prevention (i.e. saving 
unidentified people) than on the treatment of the actually 
ill, and that identifiability is not a morally significant fac-
tor: ‘statistical lives saved are just as real as identified lives 
saved; all have the same equal worth’ (Brock and Wikler 
2009: 1671). Others answered that even if such an allocation 
produced the greatest good (i.e. number of lives saved), it 
would not be fair: concentrating on prevention could save 
more lives overall, but there are important moral reasons to 
give priority to identified people who are sick now, even if 
we know that this policy will save fewer lives overall. Some 
argued (Frick 2015a) that one of these reasons is the fact 
that sick people are identified (this claim does not exclude 
the possible existence of strong moral reasons other than 
identifiability to give priority to those who are sick now). 
Similar arguments were also put forward in a discussion of 
the alleged obligation to reveal incidental findings noted in 
the course of scientific research to interested (and identified) 
people, even when it interrupts the process of conducting the 
studies (Żuradzki 2015).
The second form of the identifiability effect is signifi-
cant in the case of public undertakings which can threaten 
human lives or interests. For example, the economist and 
philosopher John Broome, discussing the problem of valu-
ing human life in economics, noted that evaluation of the 
acceptability of risky public projects (e.g. large construc-
tion projects) depends on whether there is a risk to identi-
fied or unidentified (at the moment of making the decision) 
individuals (Broome 1978). The former case meets much 
stronger objections than the latter, even if it is nearly certain 
that someone will be harmed, or even die, during the execu-
tion of a given project. A similar effect is visible in disputes 
between retributivism and consequentialism in the context of 
the risk of unintentionally punishing (unidentified) innocents 
(Bystranowski 2017).
In recent years the topic has been mentioned in the con-
text of discussions of rational and emotional components 
of normative judgments and the relationship between these 
components and normative theories of a consequentialist 
character (i.e. the rightness of a given action depends on 
actual or expected results only) or those of non-consequen-
tialist character (i.e. rightness depends on other factors as 
well, e.g. intentions, consent, etc.). Some researchers assume 
that the differentiation of decisions or evaluations based only 
on the existence in one case of an identified and in another of 
an unidentified person has no ‘rational basis’, since it is an 
2 Interestingly, this preference is reversed when people believe in 
someone’s guilt: experiments showed that people are ready to pun-
ish criminals more severely when they are identified in comparison 
to unidentified wrongdoers who have committed an analogous crime 
(Small and Loewenstein 2005).
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effect of the automatic manifestation of our emotional pre-
occupation with those ‘up-close and personal’ (e.g. Greene 
2007: 49). However, discussions are being conducted among 
philosophers on possible ways to justify the normative sig-
nificance of this preference; some scholars (Daniels 2012; 
Hare 2012; Frick 2015b; Załuski forthcoming) claim that the 
preference towards identifiable individuals is not necessarily 
irrational or morally wrong. This article will explore these 
arguments and find that they are not convincing, although 
they refer to interesting philosophical problems connected 
with e.g. interpretations of counterfactuals, aggregation, or 
probability.
Defining levels of identifiability
The difference between identified and statistical individu-
als (victims or beneficiaries) is not always clearly stated. In 
particular, the meaning of ‘statistical’ is not clear, and the 
term is often understood differently in psychological studies 
and in philosophical papers. Let me present the following 
fictional example, inspired by situations described by Hare 
(2012) and, previously, by Kamm (2001, Chapter 11).
Example 1: Alice and her friends (rescuing an identi-
fied vs an unidentified individual)
Five people (Alice, Barbara, Cecilia, Dorothea, Eva) 
are in danger. If you do nothing, Alice and one of the 
remaining women (either Barbara, or Cecilia, or Doro-
thea, or Eva) will die. Fortunately, you can take one 
of two actions (unfortunately, you cannot take both 
simultaneously): (1) one, thanks to which you will res-
cue Alice, or (2) the other, thanks to which you will 
rescue one of the four remaining women.
Who should be rescued? Are there any reasons in favour 
of either of these two options? I assume—both in this exam-
ple and in the following ones—that you have no special rela-
tionship with and no special obligations to any of them, and 
that, generally speaking, you do not know anything beyond 
the description in the example. At first glance it may seem 
that it does not matter which action you take, since in either 
case you rescue one person, while one person dies. The only 
difference is that in the first case (action 1) you know ex ante 
exactly whom you will rescue, whereas in the second (action 
2), you do not know ex ante exactly whom you will rescue; 
in fact, you may never learn whose life you saved.
Let us assume that you choose action 1: in this situation 
you save Alice (who is an ex ante identified beneficiary) and 
after that you can find out which of the remaining individu-
als will die (ex post identifiable victim). This is a case of 
two identifiable individuals. But if you choose action 2, the 
situation is more complicated: Alice will die (ex ante identi-
fied victim) and you save one person, although you do not 
know whom. Of course it is possible that after your decision 
you may learn the identity of the person you have rescued 
(ex post identifiable victim), but let us assume that by taking 
action 2 you have certainly rescued one person out of four, 
but you do not know who exactly the beneficiary of this 
action is, that is, which of the four women would have died 
had you taken action 1 (ex post unidentified beneficiary).
An analogous situation may occur in a case of harm. Let 
us examine the following example inspired by a hypothetical 
situation described by Michael Otsuka (2015).3
Example 2: Adam and his friends (sacrificing an iden-
tifiable vs an identified individual)
Five people (Adam, Bernard, Caspar, Daniel, Emil) 
are in danger. If you do nothing, all of them will die. 
Fortunately, you can take one of two actions (unfortu-
nately, you cannot take both simultaneously): (1) one, 
thanks to which you will certainly rescue Adam and 
three other men; however, through this action you will 
unintentionally contribute to the death of one of the 
remaining four (either Bernard, or Caspar, or Daniel, 
or Emil); if you choose this action, you will learn the 
identity of the victim after making the decision; (2) the 
other, thanks to which you will rescue the four remain-
ing men (Bernard, Caspar, Daniel, Emil); however, it 
can be predicted that because of this action you will 
unintentionally contribute to Adam’s death.
Which action should be taken in this situation? Again, it 
may seem that it does not matter which action you take, 
since in either case you rescue four persons, while one per-
son dies. Let us assume that you choose action 1: in this 
situation you save four people in total, but at the cost of the 
death of one. In fact, you do not know the identity of the 
victim before making the decision, but you can learn it after-
wards (ex post identifiable victim). When you choose action 
2, Adam dies (ex ante identified victim), but the remaining 
people survive and (as in the previous example) after your 
decision you may not learn the identity of the person you 
have rescued, that is, which of the four men would have died 
had you taken action 1. Similarly to the previous example, 
let us assume that after taking action 2, you are not able to 
determine exactly who the beneficiary of this action is (ex 
post unidentified beneficiary).
In both of the examples presented above, lack of aware-
ness of the identity of unidentified beneficiary can be inter-
preted in two ways. First, it may be the result of the contin-
gent cognitive limits of the decision-maker (including a lack 
3 In Otsuka’s example the number of people in danger is much 
greater; the decision-maker is a public official, and the cost of rescu-
ing this great number of people is borne by a person from outside the 
group.
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of technological accessibility that may be overcome in the 
future). Given this interpretation, in Example 1, after decid-
ing to take action 2, the result would be, for example, that 
if you had not chosen the action, one woman in particular 
(either Barbara or Cecilia or Dorothea or Eva) would have 
died—exactly that one, with specific DNA, although you are 
unable to confirm this. An analogous situation may happen 
in Example 2. I will call people of this kind ‘unidentifiable 
individuals’.
Secondly, lack of awareness of a person’s identity can 
result from non-contingent limitations, that is, from the 
indeterminacy of conditions of certain natural processes. In 
this case, in Example 1, after deciding to choose action 2, it 
would be no fact of the matter whom you rescued—in order 
to establish this information, you would have had to make a 
different decision previously, choosing action 1. Similarly, 
in Example 2, after deciding to choose action 2, it would be 
no fact of the matter who would have died had you chosen 
action 1. I assume that we are dealing with the statistical 
individual sensu stricto in the case of this second interpreta-
tion only, that is, when lack of awareness of the identity of 
the beneficiary does not result from the contingent inability 
of an agent or a technology to check someone’s identity, but 
from the very fact that after choosing one action, there is 
no such fact of the matter that would correspond to state-
ments about what would have happened had we chosen dif-
ferently. It is worth noting that this second interpretation is 
not only a hypothetical scenario discussed by philosophers, 
but also seems important in many real-life situations related 
to healthcare. For example, it is reasonable to assume that, 
following vaccination of a large population, there is no fact 
of the matter who exactly would have died had we not vac-
cinated this population. This may also be true of many pre-
ventive actions in healthcare.4
It is worth summing up our terminological distinctions, 
since all of these terms have been used inconsistently in 
the literature (both philosophical and psychological). In my 
paper an identified person is an individual who has been in 
some way identified ex ante by a decision-maker. In contrast, 
a person whose identity cannot be established ex ante is an 
ex ante unidentified individual. This class may include three 
types. A ex post identifiable person is an individual who may 
be in some way identified ex post by a decision maker. A per-
son who may not be identified even ex post may be either an 
unidentifiable or a statistical individual. The former means 
that the person’s identity cannot be established only because 
of the cognitive or technical limitations of a decision-maker; 
the latter means that an individual in a group cannot be iden-
tified for certain genuine non-contingent reasons: there is no 
fact of the matter statements concerning this person could 
refer to, thus the identity of this person could have been 
established only if a different decision had been made in 
the past.
Although the terms ‘statistical lives’, ‘statistical individu-
als’, ‘statistical victims’, etc. often appear in the psycho-
logical literature (Small and Loewenstein 2003, 2005; Small 
2015; Kogut and Ritov 2015), it is worth noting that none of 
the empirical studies of which I am aware has distinguished 
these levels of identifiability, and none has traced the differ-
ences in terms of human decisions, evaluations, emotions, 
or cognitions between them. In particular, psychological 
scenarios do not distinguish between a lack of awareness 
of identity resulting from the contingent limitations of a 
decision-maker and a lack of awareness resulting from the 
indeterminacy of conditions; that is, they fail to distinguish 
between statistical and unidentifiable individuals.
In the next chapter I will show that the difference between 
identified individuals and those who cannot be identified ex 
ante (because they are either identifiable ex post, or uniden-
tifiable, or statistical individuals) is treated as normatively 
significant by some philosophers, i.e. how they differentiate 
the strength of reasons for action on the basis on the appli-
cable type of identifiability.
Justifications of the normative significance 
of identifiability
Are there any reasons to prefer to rescue an identified 
(Alice) rather than an unidentified (one of the four remaining 
women) person in the above-mentioned situation (Example 
1)? Or, in Example 2, to prefer to unintentionally harm an 
ex ante unidentified (but ex post identifiable) person rather 
than to harm an ex ante identified person (Adam)? Do moral 
reasons depend on the level of identifiability (ex post iden-
tifiable, unidentifiable, statistical)? In recent years some 
philosophers have defended the normative significance of 
identifiability and have tried to show that in situations simi-
lar to Examples 1 and 2 there are specific reasons to choose 
action 1, thereby rescuing an identified person (Example 1), 
or harming a person that is unidentified at the very moment 
of decision-making (Example 2).
Ex ante contractualism
Let us leave aside the obvious case of act consequentialism, 
in which differences in identifiability do not matter (what we 
ought to do depends only on the actual or expected state of 
the world) and start with contractualism. The already classic 
4 E.g.: ‘This is the case, for instance, with the treatments for coronary 
heart disease and hypertension mentioned in the outset: it is impos-
sible to say, both before and after treatment, whom in the population 
that actually has benefited from the treatment, i.e., who would not 
have survived was it not for the treatment’ (Juth 2017: 5).
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statements of Scanlon include the following definition of 
ethical contractualism:
[T]hinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic 
level, thinking about what could be justified to others 
on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could 
not reasonably reject. (Scanlon 1998: 5)
In considering whether a principle could reasonably 
be rejected we should consider the weightiness of the 
burdens it involves for those on whom they fall, and 
the importance of the benefits it offers for those who 
enjoy them, leaving aside the likelihood of one’s actu-
ally falling into either of these two classes. (Scanlon 
1998: 208)
In the popular interpretation, Scanlon refers in these frag-
ments to people who will actually suffer or benefit from a 
given action (Reibetanz 1998). It means that the obligation 
to justify, to every person, the rule which was the basis of a 
given action is not related to the likelihood of gain or loss 
before the action was taken (ex ante), but to a hypothetical 
situation in which we would know what state of the world 
result from a given action. This interpretation suggests that, 
in my first two examples, contractualism of this type would 
not prefer either of the possible actions: one would deal 
with Alice’s claim versus the claim of one of the remain-
ing women (or Adam’s claim versus the claim of one of the 
four men); whether the decision-maker knew or didn’t know 
the victim’s identity before making the decision would not 
matter at all.
One of the most controversial elements of Scanlon’s ex 
post contractualism is its demand for a comparison of the 
claims of people in different possible worlds that may exist 
as the result of our actions, depending on who is the benefi-
ciary and who is the victim in a given possible world, and 
therefore this view is inconclusive in many situations that 
are more complicated than my two initial examples (Frick 
2015b: 196). This inconclusiveness stems from the fact that 
almost all our actions may lead to many, or even an infi-
nite number of, possible scenarios. Ex post contractualism 
requires taking into account claims from all of these possi-
ble worlds, even from those that are extremely improbable 
(this view does not discount claims due to their improb-
ability), and fulfilling the strongest individual claim (it also 
prohibits aggregating individual’s claims). Thus, the ex post 
perspective renders contractualist deliberations extremely 
risk-averse and contradicts many of our ordinary moral con-
victions, since we often accept risky actions in large popu-
lations that certainly lead to death (e.g. when we vaccinate 
newborns against certain serious but non-fatal childhood 
diseases, accepting that there is a remote chance of fatal side 
effects from the vaccination itself). Therefore, some authors 
have criticised Scanlon’s views, without rejecting contrac-
tualism itself, suggesting comparing the ex ante rather than 
the ex post claims of the interested parties (John 2014; Frick 
2015b). Below, I present two examples inspired by Frick 
(2015b) which may be helpful in distinguishing a different 
type of contractualism.5
Example 3: Mass vaccination (identified vs statistical 
individuals)
A million children are threatened by a viral disease 
that will kill them all if you do nothing. You have to 
choose between one of two vaccinations (you cannot 
have both).
• Vaccination 1 is a sure thing: it will certainly save the life 
of every child. However, it does not completely protect 
children from a virus that results in incurable paralysis of 
one leg of every child. After choosing this vaccination it 
is impossible to determine who would have died if Vac-
cination 2 had been chosen instead (i.e. it is statistically 
certain that, with Vaccination 1, some children, more or 
less 1000, are statistical beneficiaries).
• Vaccination 2 is risky: on the basis of previous cases, 
doctors estimate that thanks to it every child will have 
a 0.999 chance of being completely healed. However, 
every child runs a 0.001 risk that this vaccination will 
not work and that the virus will cause the child’s death; 
I assume that probabilities are independent6 in the case 
of each child (victims are unidentified ex ante, but they 
will be identifiable ex post).
Example 4: Mass vaccination (identified vs identified 
individuals)
The situation is identical to Example 3, except that:
5 However, Frick (2015b) does not differentiate between what I have 
called statistical and unidentifiable individuals, and he uses the term 
‘statistical lives’ to refer to both types.
6 There is a significant difference between Examples 1 or 2 and 
Example 3 regarding the dependence or independence of probabili-
ties: In the two initial examples the probabilities were dependent (it 
was sure that one and only one person would die); here, I assume that 
they are independent (it may happen that if we choose Vaccination 
2, more or less than 1000 children will die, or even—although this 
would be extremely improbable—all of them, or none of them). Does 
this difference matter? I assume that this is not normatively impor-
tant because the difference between the dependence or independence 
of probabilities is not as clear as it may seem at first sight (see below 
and see also: Otsuka 2015: 90).
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• Vaccination 2a will save 999,000 children out of a mil-
lion. However, due to a particular genotype it will cer-
tainly not work for a thousand children, those with a cer-
tain genotype, who will die as a result of this viral disease 
and who can be identified ex ante by the decision-maker.
What should we do in these situations? In both of them, 
if we use Vaccination 2 (or 2a), a similar number of children 
will most probably die. In Example 3, the probability that 
1000 children (± 100) will die is very high (0.99), and the 
probability that at least 1 child will die is extremely high or 
even statistically certain (1 − (999/1000)1,000,000). In Example 
4, it is known for certain that 1000 children with a certain 
genotype will not survive the disease (identified victims). 
These examples can easily illustrate the difference between 
the three types of views, two of which do not recognise the 
normative significance of the preference towards identified 
individuals, one of which (the third) does. Below, I enumer-
ate these two views and discuss the third one.
The first is the ex post view referring to the principle of 
full information. Here identifiability is not itself normatively 
significant, so in both the above Examples (3 and 4), Vac-
cination 1 should be used. This view recommends acting 
in a way that substantially improves the outcomes of those 
who otherwise would end up as worst off, no matter if they 
are identified or not for a decision maker (Fleurbaey and 
Voorhoeve 2013, their slogan is: ‘decide as you would with 
full information’).
Second, contractualism behind the hypothetical veil of 
ignorance along with the expected utility rule. This view is 
also agnostic about the normative significance of identifi-
ability, since it claims that because of fairness a (public) 
decision maker should always act as if he didn’t know peo-
ple’s identities (even if in fact he knows them), therefore in 
both the above Examples (3 and 4), the second Vaccination 
should be used (2 or 2a). This is so because this view also 
assumes the expected utility rule: in this particular case it 
is reasonable to assume that a choice that involves the tiny 
risk of death (0.001) would have a higher expected value for 
every child than a choice that involves the certain and incur-
able paralysis of one leg. Thus a (public) decision maker 
should maximise the expected utility on behalf of each child 
separately because it would be in every child’s interest (Har-
sanyi 1977).
Since the first two views do not consider identifiability to 
be practically significant, I want to concentrate on another 
view that finds it important.
This third view is ex ante contractualism behind the natu-
ral veil of ignorance. In contrast to the second view, ex ante 
contractualism ascribes an important normative role only to 
the lack of knowledge of a decision maker that is the result 
of ‘natural’ processes, and not to the result of a hypothetical 
(or forced) veil of ignorance in the sense proposed by Rawls 
(1999) and used by Harsanyi (1977). Similarly to the second 
view, it appeals to an argument from a single person case: 
‘the rightness of an action is a function of each individual’s 
personal reasons for rejecting a principle that licenses the 
action. An act is wrong if and only if there is someone who 
can complain that we failed to treat her in a way that was jus-
tifiable to her, not because its consequences were imperson-
ally bad.’ (Frick 2015b: 187). Therefore, this view assumes 
the following rule:
Rule 1: Satisfy the strongest individual claim.
Satisfying the strongest individual claim known ex 
ante by a decision-maker is a pro tanto moral reason 
that contributes to making an action right or wrong, all 
things considered. (Frick 2015b: 216, 220; cf.; John 
2014: 35)
This rule implies that identifiability is normatively sig-
nificant, therefore in Example 3, Vaccination 2 should be 
used; whereas in Example 4—Vaccination 1. It is so because 
both these Examples might be decomposed into one million 
single-person choices occurring in parallel. Due to the lack 
of knowledge regarding the identity of potential victims, the 
decision-maker in Example 3 might compare the claims of 
someone who would certainly be afflicted with a paralysed 
leg (Vaccination 1) with the claims of someone who would 
be exposed to a minor risk of death (0.001) during treatment 
(Vaccination 2). In this case, a decision maker could assume 
that every reasonable agent would prefer to be exposed to a 
minor risk of death and thus Vaccination 2 is morally prefer-
able, because, as the definition says, no one ‘could reason-
ably reject’ this decision ex ante.7
Nevertheless, the situation would be different in Example 
4 because a decision-maker would know (or could easily 
learn) the identity of carriers of a certain genotype before 
making the decision. In this case, a decision maker should 
compare the claims of someone who would certainly be 
afflicted with a paralysed leg (Vaccination 1) with the claims 
of a representative of the identified (or easily identifiable) 
1000 children who would certainly die after taking Vaccina-
tion 2. Therefore, the strongest claim in Example 4 would 
obviously be made by a representative of potential victims 
and thus we should (morally) prefer Vaccination 1.
The main problem with ex ante contractualism is related 
to the ambiguity of the concept of the ‘natural’ veil of 
7 However, Frick emphasises that ex ante contractualism should 
not be treated as the sole rule determining what is right and what is 
wrong, but one of many right/wrong-making properties. This means 
that sometimes other properties, in particular the number of saved 
people, can prevail over the normative significance of identifiabil-
ity (meaning that, in examples such as ‘one identified vs x statistical 
persons’, Frick may assume that rescuing a greater number of ex ante 
unidentified persons is preferable, if only x is a sufficiently large num-
ber).
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ignorance. As I demonstrate, the expected ‘naturalness’ of 
the veil of ignorance is problematic in cases that are inter-
mediate between Examples 3 and 4, in which we can be sure 
that some as yet unidentified individuals exist and will be 
harmed because of our actions, but in which, due to cogni-
tive limitations, it is impossible to obtain this information 
before a decision. Let us view this problem by means of 
another example.
Example 5: Mass vaccination (identified vs unidentifi-
able individuals)
• Vaccination 1, as in Example 3, is a sure thing, but after 
choosing this vaccination it is impossible due to technical 
reasons alone to determine who would have died if Vac-
cination 2b had been chosen (if Vaccination 1 is chosen, 
they are unidentifiable beneficiaries).
• Vaccination 2b is risky but will save most children. How-
ever, it will certainly not work for carriers of the very 
rare gene X, who will die as a result of this viral disease. 
In large populations, usually about 1000 children in one 
million are carriers of X, but due to certain technical 
limitations, the decision-maker has not identified ex ante 
carriers of X in this population, neither have the carri-
ers of X identified themselves as potential victims (they, 
though unidentified ex ante, will be identifiable ex post).
In this example, a decision maker initial lack of knowl-
edge of their identity results from technical limitations alone, 
so there are no statistical people here, only unidentifiable 
ones. In this case, ex ante contractualism would assume that 
the question of which vaccination should be used depends on 
the very nature of these technical limitations. If a genetic test 
for the presence of gene X in Example 5 were ‘simple and 
costless’ (Frick 2015b: 193), we should use Vaccination 1, as 
this last example would be similar to Example 4. Contrast-
ingly, if the test were too complicated or expensive to carry 
out, we should use Vaccination 2b, as this example in such a 
case would be much closer to Example 3.8 Why? Because ex 
ante contractualism differentiates decisions not on the basis 
of a distinction between statistical and unidentifiable people 
(as defined in “Defining levels of identifiability” section), 
but based on the ‘natural’ availability of information to a 
decision-maker about the identity of the people involved. 
In this example, even if we failed to identify carriers of X 
and we used Vaccination 1, there still would be a fact of the 
matter of who is a carrier of X and who is not. Therefore, 
in Example 5, the reasons for choosing Vaccination 2b are 
based not only on a specific moment of comparing claims 
(ex ante), but also on the state of knowledge, technical 
expertise, and subjective perspective of the decision-maker. 
For example, if determining the genotype of the people in 
Example 5 were made easier as a result of some new scien-
tific discovery, this could have normative implications for a 
decision-maker. Moreover, according to this view, in many 
cases evaluation of the rightness of a decision in this type 
of situation may depend on the inclination (or aversion) of 
a given decision-maker to acquire new information on the 
identity of the victims.
Another problematic aspect of this view is how to inter-
pret what it means ‘to identify’ an individual. In the above 
quoted psychological research by Small and Loewenstein 
(2003), the mere awareness of a decision-maker that some-
one has been already been chosen (with no further informa-
tion expected) was enough for many people to favour the 
person identified in such a way in comparison with a person 
who was expected to be chosen from a group. But ‘knowing’ 
someone’s identity in such a way is meaningless. Similarly 
meaningless is knowing someone only by her surname, ID 
or genotype (as in Example 4). Is there any genuine moral 
reason to prefer helping some people over others solely on 
the basis of such meaningless information? I do not think so. 
So maybe ‘to identify’ someone it is necessary to establish 
some relation, for example to have a direct contact with her, 
e.g. an eye contact that enable to see her body or its particu-
lar fragment (e.g. is seeing someone’s face more meaningful 
than seeing someone’s finger?). Or, maybe we must know 
something about her e.g. something about her preferences, 
views, personal history, career. In contrast with Hare (2016) 
who writes that ‘it [morally] matters whether you know who 
is who’ I do not find such information morally relevant, in 
particular in the case of a public decision maker.
The next significant problem with this view is related 
to the violation of the seemingly obvious rule which states 
that a decision-maker (in particular a public decision-maker) 
should rescue a larger rather than a smaller number of peo-
ple, in particular in a context similar to the above examples, 
which refer to public health decisions (but see Taurek 1977). 
However, according to ex ante contractualism, there are situ-
ations in which rescuing x people identified by a decision-
maker is more important than reducing individual risks of 
death in a group of people, even if it is known in advance 
that this second policy will lead to a greater number (i.e. 
more than x) of deaths of ex ante unidentified people. Frick 
surprisingly claims that this view ‘is consistent with many 
people’s intuition’ (p. 219). Accepting such a rule in the 
case of public decision-makers would mean that their actions 
would not be required to maximise the number of saved peo-
ple, solely because the decision-makers would have some 
irrelevant or meaningless information about some of them 
(such as ID numbers, names, etc.) at the moment of decision. 
8 Frick (2015b: 193) refers to procedures that are one the one hand 
‘simple and costless’ but on the other ‘extremely costly’, so his dis-
tinction seems not to be exhaustive.
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This, in contrast to Frick’s opinion, is obviously a controver-
sial claim. Although knowledge of identity is certainly an 
important factor in personal relations and may have an influ-
ence on the psychological aspects of the decision-making 
process, ex ante contractualism does not vindicate its norma-
tive significance in the case of public decisions.
Distributive justice and the concentration of risks 
and chances
Another interesting explanation of the normative implica-
tions of the effect of identified individuals was presented by 
Daniels (2012; see also Frick 2015a). His starting point was 
a story similar to the one in Example 1. He argued that in 
this kind of situation there is an additional reason to rescue 
Alice, only because ‘the concentration of risk matters mor-
ally’ (Daniels 2012: 41). At the moment of decision-making, 
Alice’s situation is worse than that of any of her four friends: 
she will die without medication, but if we decide to rescue 
her, each of her four friends still has a 0.75 probability for 
survival.9 Daniels also suggested that the stronger the rea-
sons for rescuing Alice, the wider the distribution of risk 
within the group of unidentified victims. For example, if 
there were 100 women instead of four, and the risk of dying 
was 0.01, the reasons to rescue Alice rather than reducing 
the risk of death for each of those 100 women would be 
even stronger. It is worth noting that the problem does not 
lie in awareness of the probability of death or in possible 
psychological costs: his view does not depend on whether 
the interested parties are aware of the danger. In this type of 
situation, he seems to accept the following rule of distribu-
tive fairness:
Rule 2: Distribute chances and risks fairly.
Helping those who have a smaller chance of survival in 
a given situation is a pro tanto moral reason that con-
tributes to making an action right or wrong, all things 
considered.
Philosophers who seemingly accept such a rule (Broome 
1984; Saunders 2008; James 2013) perceive the chance 
to survive or the risk of death as separate values that are 
subject to distribution, similarly to other goods, due to the 
requirements of fairness. For example, John Broome argued 
in favour of the requirement of a random method of the allo-
cation of indivisible good in situations in which more than 
one person submits a claim to this good and there are no 
other reasons for ascribing it to one given person rather than 
another. Another follower of this approach summarised this 
view: ‘I believe the chance of a benefit is itself a benefit; 
after all, almost everyone prefers to have any chance rather 
than none’ (Saunders 2008: 367). However, such a view is 
controversial and the following easy counterargument may 
be put forward against it: ‘Why isn’t living itself the relevant 
good here, rather than chances of living? If I die then I am 
not significantly better off for having had a high chance of 
living. If I live then I am not significantly worse off for hav-
ing had a low chance of living’ (Hare 2012: 385; cf.; Hen-
ning 2015).
It is, however, easy to prove that there are situations in 
which Rule 2, along with some non-controversial premises, 
would lead a decision-maker to favour ex ante unidentified 
people and not ex ante identified people; thus, apart from 
other problems related to the perception of a chance to sur-
vive as an independent good in itself, whose distribution is 
subject to evaluation, this solution would not even accom-
plish the goal it was designed to achieve. Let us examine this 
on the following example, inspired by a situation described 
by Hare (2012).
Example 1a: Anthony and his friends (rescuing an 
identified vs an unidentified individual)
Five people are in danger (Anthony, Bernard, Cas-
par, Daniel, Emil). If you do nothing, everyone will 
die. Fortunately, you can take one of two actions 
(but, unfortunately, you can’t take both at the same 
time): (1) one, thanks to which you will certainly res-
cue Anthony (the remaining four men will die); (2) 
the other, thanks to which you will rescue one of the 
four remaining men; however, at the very moment of 
decision-making you do not know which one; you 
will learn his identity after the event (Anthony and 
the three remaining men will die).
In this example, all five people are in the same situa-
tion: if you choose action 1, none of the four men (Bernard, 
Caspar, Daniel, Emil) has any chance of survival. If you 
choose action 2, Anthony is the one who has no chance to 
survive, but each of the remaining four men has a 0.25 prob-
ability of staying alive. Accepting Daniels’s rule that the 
distribution of chances is of moral importance and adding 
the non-controversial rule of aggregating identical claims 
(in a situation when every person from a larger group has 
a claim identical to a claim of every person from a smaller 
group, the size of the group is decisive and one should help 
a larger rather than a smaller group of people), in this case 
the ex ante unidentified person should be rescued (one of the 
four men) rather than Anthony, an ex ante identified person. 
Why? If you take action 1, it is obvious that you will rescue 
Anthony (an identified beneficiary), but it is obvious that 
the other four men, having no chances to survive, will die 
(ex ante identified victims). However, if you take action 2, it 
is obvious that Anthony will die (ex ante identified victim), 
but simultaneously, you are not only saving one of the four 
9 The main difference is that Daniels assumes that the probabilities 
are independent but see footnote 6.
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remaining men, but you are distributing a chance of sur-
vival amounting to 0.25 among four people. Since Daniels 
assumed that the chances of survival constitute an independ-
ent good subject to fair distribution, in this case it would 
be much fairer, in accordance with his view, to distribute 
the chances to survive among four people than to ‘give’ all 
chances to Anthony alone. Therefore, the problem in this 
case is that in some situations Daniels’ proposal would lead 
to favouring unidentified people, which is contrary to the 
goal it was created to achieve.
Concentrating good effects and distributing bad 
ones
Another way of defending the normative significance of the 
identifiability effect was presented by Hare (2012). Contrary 
to the previous two views, he assumes that being a statistical 
individual, in the strictest sense, is of crucial significance. In 
contrast, being classified as ex post identifiable or as uniden-
tifiable is not morally significant. Hare developed two rules 
that, in his opinion, lie behind the normative significance of 
preference for identified victims.
Rule 3: Concentrate good effects.
‘Other things being equal, given a choice between 
doing something very good for one person but very 
bad for one person, and doing something quite good 
for four people but very bad for one person, you ought, 
other things being equal, to do the former’.
Rule 4: Distribute bad effects.
‘Given a choice between doing something very good 
for one person but very bad for one person, and doing 
something very good for one person but quite bad for 
each of four people, you ought, other things being 
equal, to do the latter’ (Hare 2012: 387).
These rules would work in the two initial Examples 1 and 
2 as follows (as long as they are interpreted as concerning 
statistical individuals sensu stricto). The result of action 1 
is very good for one person (Alice/Adam), very bad for one 
person (one of four remaining persons, i.e. the one who will 
die) and neutral for the three remaining people (they will 
survive regardless of the action we choose). The result of 
action 2 is only moderately good for each of four people 
(because it only increases the probability of their survival 
from 0.75 to 1) and very bad for one person (Alice/Adam). 
The key question is: why is action 2 only moderately good 
for four people but not very good for one person in Examples 
1 and 2? This is because statistical beneficiaries sensu stricto 
are assumed here: after taking action 2, there is no such fact 
of the matter to which the statements regarding the people 
we saved would refer. Therefore we cannot claim that we 
rescued one identified person, but only that we increased 
the probability of survival of each of four identified people 
from 0.75 to 110, which means that we certainly rescued one 
statistical person, but it is impossible to know who exactly 
was rescued. Therefore, in this case, if one accepts Rules 3 
and 4, one should choose action 1 in Examples 1 and 2. 
In both these cases our action is very bad for one person; 
the actions in these examples do not differ in this respect. 
However, according to Rule 3, it is better to do something 
very good for one person than something moderately good 
for four people.
In Example 1a, discussed in the previous subsection (pro-
vided that it is interpreted as concerning statistical individu-
als sensu stricto), the result of action 1 would be very good 
for one person (Anthony) and moderately bad for each of the 
remaining four people (the probability of survival is reduced 
from 0.25 to 0 for each of them). The result of action 2 is 
very good for one person (the one that will survive), very 
bad for one person (Anthony), and neutral for the three 
remaining people (they will die regardless of which action 
we choose). In this case also, one should choose action 1, 
because Rule 4 says it is better to do something moderately 
bad for each of four people than something very bad for one 
person (moreover, in both cases we do something very good 
for one person, so the actions do not differ in this respect).
Those two rules are also interesting in terms of the dilem-
mas from Examples 3‒5. In Example 3 they provide addi-
tional reasons (different from ex ante contractualism) to 
favour Vaccination 2. After choosing vaccination 1 there 
is no such fact of the matter that would refer to a statement 
concerning which of the one million children we rescued 
(as previously, the point of reference is another possible 
action rather than the state of the world, in which we do 
not intervene). Therefore choosing vaccination 1 we are not 
doing anything very good for any group of children, but 
something minimally good for each of one million children. 
However, no argument of this kind exists in either of Exam-
ples 4 and 5, since, after choosing Vaccination 1, in both of 
these examples there would be such a fact of the matter that 
somebody was rescued (although in Example 4 we would 
not know this person, but in Example 5 we would). It means 
that in both of these cases (Examples 4 and 5), in choosing 
vaccination 1 we would do something very good for 1000 
existing children.
The most important problem regarding this view refers to 
the distinction between statistical beneficiaries sensu stricto 
and the impossibility of their identification by a decision-
maker. The distinction, though theoretically very precise, 
may seem morally arbitrary. The way the vaccination works 
in the above-mentioned examples provides an additional 
moral reason: if it works in an indeterminate way, one should 
10 Let me remind the reader that, for simplicity, the probabilities in 
these two initial examples are dependent.
304 T. Żuradzki 
1 3
choose Vaccination 2; if it works only for people with par-
ticular genetic material, one should choose Vaccination 1. A 
similar problem is connected with Examples 1 and 2: if we 
interpret them so that they refer to unidentifiable individuals 
whose identity is not known to the decision-maker, those 
two rules give us no additional reason to choose action 1 
over action 2 in either case.
Another doubt regarding this view is related to the nor-
mative weight of the two rules presented above. Hare writes 
clearly: ‘Other things being equal, our obligation to aid two 
“merely statistical” people is stronger than our obligation to 
aid one “identified” one’ (Hare 2012: 389), suggesting that he 
limits the normative meaning of the identified victim’s effect 
to a very narrow group of hypothetical situations in which we 
would have a choice between rescuing either one statistical or 
one identified person. This means that the practical signifi-
cance of his rules would be rather negligible and they would 
have no application to the real problems connected with medi-
cal care, vaccinations, or research ethics.
Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed three main propositions that 
attempt to vindicate the normative significance of identifi-
ability. In each case, I showed that the arguments in favour 
of the normative implications of the effect are problematic. 
However, the expectation that decision-makers will treat uni-
dentified individuals equally to identified ones—which is the 
conclusion of this paper—is problematic as well. First, it was 
argued that informing the decision-maker about this psycho-
logical phenomenon reduces the number of decisions to make 
helpful donations, probably because the awareness of the iden-
tifiability effect undermines feelings of sympathy, and, as a 
result, reduces the total sum of donations (Small et al. 2007). 
Secondly, many people treat unidentified individuals (and in 
particular statistical individuals) as fictional characters. If we 
want to use moral technology to enhance decisions about uni-
dentified people, we cannot require morally sensitive agents 
to be akin to the character played by Mia Farrow in Woody 
Allen’s film The Purple Rose of Cairo, who was undisturbed 
by the fact that her beloved was fictional and who excitedly 
told a friend: ‘I just met the most wonderful man (…) He’s 
fictional, but you can’t have everything!’
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